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Regional trade agreements have been a major and recurring feature of the global 
economy during the last half century.  The evolution of thinking about such 
agreements has tracked the policy developments.  The first wave of regionalism, led 
by the western European customs union which followed the 1957 Treaty of Rome, 
was analysed within the framework of Vinerian customs union theory.  The second 
wave, which was characterized by agreements in the 1980s going beyond preferential 
tariff reduction towards deeper integration, was considered to be a “New 
Regionalism” requiring new tools.  The third wave of bilateral agreements in the early 
2000s continues many of the trends towards deeper integration, although it is in some 
respects hardly even regionalism. 
  This paper first briefly describes the three waves of regionalism.  It then 
reviews customs union theory and the analysis of deep integration.  In both of these 
approaches to regional trade agreements, the nation state is the basic unit of analysis. 
The fifth section goes into the question of the appropriate level of analysis for the 
global economy; are the roles of the nation state and of multilateral institutions 
evolving in the twenty-first century, and what scope will exist for the intermediate 
units formed by regional trade agreements?  The final section draws some 
conclusions. 
 
2.  The Three Waves of Regionalism 
 
Since the signing of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1947, 
three waves of regionalism have swept the world trading system.  During the 1950s 
and 1960s the “rush to discrimination” was led by Western Europe, which founded 
the only substantial new customs union of the second half of the twentieth century and 
also established a complex network of preferential arrangements with other trade 
partners.
1  The European customs union was taken as a model by groups of 
                                                 
1 The quotation is from Gardner Patterson (1966).  The European Community’s preferential trading 
arrangements (PTAs) with non-members were in many respects a substitute for the missing common   2
developing countries in Africa, the Caribbean, Central America, and South America, 
but even the most promising of these arrangements, the East African Community and 
the Central American Common Market, collapsed during the 1970s.
2  The customs 
unions agreed among developing countries all failed because they were based on a 
regional form of import substitution which inevitably led to conflict, because each 
member wanted a regional market for its own inefficient industries but was unwilling 
to buy the expensive or poor quality import-substitutes being produced by their 
partners.  The European customs union had similar strains, but for most goods (except 
farm products) the least-cost supplier within the union was globally competitive, and 
the political will for greater economic union outweighed perceived costs even for 
large net economic losers such as the United Kingdom, which joined in 1973. 
  A second wave of regionalism was initiated by the United States’ departures 
from the GATT non-discrimination principle in the first half of the 1980s and peaked 
with the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) negotiations in the early 
1990s, which coincided with the European Union’s 1992 project for completing the 
internal EU market.  Although NAFTA was signed and implemented, the EU 
completed its 1992 program and Australia and New Zealand deepened their free trade 
area into the Closer Economic Relations, the major trading nations reaffirmed their 
commitment to the non-discrimination principle with the successful conclusion of the 
1986-94 Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations and the establishment in 
1995 of the World Trade Organization (WTO) as the successor to the GATT.  As in 
the first wave, there was a demonstration effect as groups of developing countries 
worried about the need to establish and strengthen their own regional groupings.  The 
geographical scope was wider than in the first wave as Latin American regional 
arrangements such as Mercosur and African customs union in various overlapping 
incarnations were joined by Asian regional organizations.   The practical outcomes of 
these follower RTAs were, however, minimal for much the same reasons as in the 
                                                                                                                                            
foreign policy (some were preludes to membership, others such as the Yaoundé/Lomé/Cotonou 
Conventions retained special relationships with former colonies and similar African, Caribbean and 
Pacific economies).  These PTAs contributed to the US abandonment of the non-discrimination 
principle, when it signed its own PTAs with favoured clients in the Caribbean and Israel, and to poor 
countries’ opposition to multilateral trade liberalization, which may erode their preferences’ value, but 
in themselves they are not of great significance for the global trading system. 
2The various RTAs mentioned in this chapter are described and analysed more fully in Pomfret 
(1997/2001).   3
first wave; each partner was unwilling to grant other partners non-trivial preferential 
access to its own protected markets.
3 
    In the opening years of the twenty-first century, a third wave of RTAs has 
been gathering force, led by Asian countries, which had previously been the strongest 
bulwarks of non-discrimination.  The emergence of Asian regionalism can be dated 
from the aftermath of the 1997 Asian Crisis, and was partly in reaction to 
dissatisfaction with the role of the Bretton Woods institutions.  The earliest 
manifestations were in calls for an Asian Monetary Fund or even monetary union, 
although this led only to the 2000 Chiang Mai Initiative, which provided (limited) 
stand-by swap facilities for countries facing currency crises (Pomfret, 2005a).   
However, the collapse of the 1999 WTO meetings in Seattle and the diminishing 
significance of APEC led to calls for new approaches to trade liberalization in the 
Asia-Pacific region.  Bilateral negotiations were begun in 1999/2000 by Japan with 
Singapore, South Korea, Canada and Mexico, by South Korea with Chile and New 
Zealand as well as with Japan, and by Singapore with New Zealand, Australia, the 
USA, Canada and other countries.  In their embracing of bilateral agreements, the 
Asian countries were joined, especially under the G.W. Bush administration, by the 
USA, which started to negotiate bilateral trade pacts with friendly countries such as 
Jordan, Morocco and Australia.  As is obvious from these examples, although the 
third wave is seen as a recrudescence of regionalism, many of the bilaterals are not 
regional.
4  It is also not clear how novel the pattern is; bilateral agreements have long 
existed in areas such as double-taxation or investment treaties, without being labelled 
as a type of RTA. 
Whether regional/bilateral agreements are becoming a major feature of the 
global trading system (as opposed to a major preoccupation of trade negotiators) is 
not obvious.  It is sometimes asserted that, because the number of RTAs notified to 
the WTO reached an all-time high in the early 2000s, regionalism was more prevalent 
                                                 
3 The Asian RTAs were especially ineffective.  The two largest economies in the South Asian 
Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), India and Pakistan, withheld MFN treatment from 
one another.  The Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) was in abeyance while Iran was at war 
with Iraq.  Most empirical studies find minimal effects on trade for SAARC or ECO, and even for the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), which was the least moribund of the Asian RTAs. 
4 When Thailand under Thaksin, for example, embarked on a policy of negotiating bilateral trade 
agreements, it began with Bahrain and Australia before moving on to the USA and Japan; this pattern 
is weakening Thailand’s regional trading arrangements by eroding preferential treatment negotiated 
within ASEAN.  South Korea’s experimentation with bilaterals started with Chile and New Zealand, 
willing collocutors, but hardly regional neighbours and never likely to generate large bilateral trade 
flows.   4
than ever.  Crawford and Fiorentino (2005) in the opening paragraph of their survey 
of RTAs state that “Between January 2004 and February 2005 alone, 43 RTAs have 
been notified to the WTO, making this the most prolific RTA period in recorded 
history”.  Such counting is nonsense, because some arrangements are important but 
many are inconsequential.  One reason for the rapid increase in the number of RTAs 
during the 1990s was the proliferation of bilateral and plurilateral free trade 
agreements among countries of the former Council for Mutual Economic Assistance; 
these were primarily a response to regional disintegration, rather than a trend towards 
regionalism in Central and Eastern Europe.  On 1
st. May 2004 when eight eastern 
European countries joined the EU, the web of bilateral trading arrangements among 
the accession countries and of preferential agreements between the accession 
countries and the EU became redundant, although with the incorporation of eight 
more countries into the EU customs union the degree of regionalism was increased.  
According to Crawford and Fiorentino (2005, n21) 65 RTAs notified to the WTO 
were abrogated on that date, so that by their own measure net RTA formation between 
January 2004 and February 2005 was minus 22, i.e. 2004 saw the biggest retreat from 
RTAs in recorded history.
5 
The problems of simple counting are highlighted by examination of the twenty 
RTAs notified to the WTO in the first half of 2005 (Table 1).  Six were bilaterals 
(Australia-Thailand, Japan-Mexico, and Panama-El Salvador) which were double-
counted because they are under GATT Article XXIV and GATS Article V.  Twelve 
were bilaterals involving pairs of eastern European countries (mostly among regions 
of former Yugoslavia, i.e. reflecting regional disintegration).  The other two were an 
EFTA-Tunisia agreement and an Israel-Romania agreement.
6  None of these twenty 
agreements can be expected to have a significant impact on world trade or even on the 
trade of the signatories.  This is, of course, not to argue that no RTAs are important – 
the EU, NAFTA, Mercosur and some others obviously are – but it is to caution 
against simplistic claims of proliferating regionalism in world trade.
7 
                                                 
5 The precise number may be disputed but the order of magnitude is clear.  According to the World 
Bank (2005, 53), the number of RTAs fell from 285 to 229 as a result of the EU enlargement in 2004. 
6 The European Free Trade Association (EFTA) consists of Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and 
Switzerland. 
7 Much of the confusion about the number of RTAs derives from the WTOs website, which includes a 
dramatically rising but effectively meaningless chart of the cumulative number of RTAs registered with 
the WTO since 1948.  Despite the statement in the accompanying text that “Not all RTAs notified in 
the last half century are still in force today”, no account is taken of abrogation or non-implementation 
and the visual impact is of rampant regionalism.  The same chart appears as Chart 1 in the Discussion   5
In contrast, it is arguable that, despite the increased attention being paid to 
regional arrangements, the hold of multilateralism is stronger than ever as practically 
all trading nations have now acceded to the WTO, with lower trade barriers and 
stronger trade dispute settlement procedures than ever before.  Perceptions of WTO 
enfeeblement reflect a tendency of news reporting to highlight conflict rather than 
accord.  The end of the Multifiber Arrangement in December 2004 was a monumental 
step in global non-discriminatory trade liberalization which is surely good for global 
resource allocation and for people who wear clothes, but the press coverage in early 
2005 highlighted negative effects on countries suffering from preference erosion 
(such as Bangladesh) and the impact on producers in powerful nations.  Even as the 
USA and EU were negotiating safeguard measures against the surge of clothing 
imports from China, little mention was made of the fact that these were legal under 
China’s WTO accession accord but limited in duration to 2008.  Other striking 
examples of the increased rule of law in international trade since the creation of the 
WTO are the ability of small countries to win cases against major trading nations (and 
have the offending policies modified) and the willingness of the US Congress to 
amend US tax law (on FISCs) to comply with a WTO judgment. 
 
3.  The Economics of Preferential Trade Policies 
 
Regional trading arrangements (RTAs) are often described by the five levels of 
integration set out by Bela Balassa (1961):  
•  preferential trading arrangement (PTA), 
•  free trade area (PTA with zero internal tariffs),  
•  customs union (FTA + common external trade policy),  
•  common market (CU + free movement of factors of production),  
•  economic union (CM + common economic policies). 
The five categories are often treated as a sequencing pattern towards closer integration 
as well as a taxonomy of deeper and deeper integration.
8  The defining feature of all 
                                                                                                                                            
Paper (Crawford and Fiorentino, 2005) linked to the WTO webpage on the prevalence of RTAs; 
although the paper contains an official disclaimer, the authors are staff of the WTO Secretariat. The 
WTO has a duty of transparency when RTAs are notified but it should also provide reasoned 
commentary rather than scaremongering about the threat of regionalism. 
8 A debate in East Asia, which has been particularly strong since the 1997 Asian Crisis, is whether the 
sequence can be reversed with monetary integration being used as a stimulus for trade integration   6
of these RTAs is that trade among members is treated differently to trade with non-
members. 
Such preferential trading arrangements are permitted under the GATT/WTO 
rules, notably under Article XXIV on customs unions and free trade areas (and the 
parallel Article V of the General Agreement on Trade in Services) and under the 
Enabling Clause for special treatment for developing countries.  They are, however, 
contrary to the spirit of the GATT, embodied in Article I which requires any GATT 
signatory to treat all other signatories equally, and Article XXIV contains stringent 
conditions which have seldom, if ever, been fully met in practice.  There is also a 
paradox between the political economy forces encouraging politicians to embark on 
preferential trade policies and the economic forces working in favour of global 
adherence to the non-discrimination principle; despite dozens of plans for regional 
trading arrangements many failed to come to fruition, and among those RTAs that did 
begin to operate many failed to survive long or to exercise a significant influence on 
trade flows.
9 
The ambiguity in trade law captures the classic insight by Jacob Viner that any 
discriminatory trade policy, such as a customs union, is by its nature second-best.  
One distortion, the differential treatment between a member’s domestic products and 
products from other member countries of the customs union, is removed and this 
permits a more efficient allocation of resources if imports from the partner replace 
domestic production or increase domestic consumption. At the same time, a new 
distortion is introduced between imports from member and non-member countries 
which were previously treated equally, and this can lead to inefficient diversion of 
trade from the least-cost global producer to a partner country which is less efficient 
but has an artificial price edge due to the preferential tariff.  The trade creation and 
trade diversion effects of customs union accession work in opposite directions to 
leave the direction of change in welfare of the country joining a customs union, and of 
the world, theoretically ambiguous. 
                                                                                                                                            
(Pomfret, 2005a). 
9 Many regional agreements are intended to demonstrate special friendship.  Especially at regional or 
bilateral summit meetings between autocratic leaders, who have few foreign policy instruments, a 
bilateral or plurilateral trade agreement is a popular outcome.   This has been especially apparent in the 
former Soviet Union, where Presidents have announced a large number of RTAs, which have been 
allowed to lapse before they were implemented or were abandoned as political allegiances shifted 
(Pomfret, 2005c).    7
Thus, although a discriminatory tariff reduction, as in a customs union or free 
trade area, may be welfare-improving, the presumption is that, with competitive 
markets, removal of trade barriers on a non-discriminatory basis would be first-best 
(Johnson, 1965; Cooper and Massell, 1965).  Politicians are often attracted to regional 
trading agreements for political reasons, but Viner’s analysis explains why economic 
forces work against such arrangements in practice.  The many RTAs involving 
developing countries broke down because each member might have liked trade to be 
diverted in favour of its own inefficient manufacturing enterprises, but did not want to 
bear the trade diversion costs of importing from its partners inefficient industries.  If 
RTAs survived, then there was a suspicion that they involved some cost to third 
countries, eg. through terms of trade effects in favour of the union members, and this 
justifies the sceptical position vis-à-vis RTAs in the GATT. 
A more positive attitude towards RTAs emerges if they are viewed as stepping 
stones to multilateral trade liberalization.  Kemp and Wan (1976) showed that, if 
signatories of a preferential trading arrangement are required to ensure that no third 
country suffers a welfare loss, then there always exist welfare-improving PTAs and 
the process of forming such groupings will continue until all tariffs are zero.  This 
proposition, however, requires members of a RTA to pay attention to the welfare of 
non-members and it ignores negotiating costs. 
Although Balassa’s taxonomy is sometimes seen as a sequence towards closer 
economic union, the decision to form an FTA or CU seems to be a choice rather than 
a sequence.  An FTA is easier to negotiate, because it does not require agreement on a 
common external policy or on how to share tariff revenue.
10  An FTA, however, 
suffers from the problem of trade deflection.  Direct trade deflection, i.e. third-
countries routing their supplies through the low-tariff member country as a point of 
entry into the FTA even when the final destination is a high-tariff member, can be 
averted by setting rules of origin (RoOs).  If the low-tariff country has a substantial 
domestic production, then RoOs may not prevent indirect trade deflection, whereby 
the external imports go the low-tariff country while that country’s own producers 
export to the high tariff (and therefore high-price) member country.  The outcome is a 
race to the bottom, because the low-tariff country collects all of the FTA’s tariff 
                                                 
10 A CU may require agreement on revenue sharing because the collection of customs duties under the 
common external tariff is not equitably distributed across countries, eg. in the EU Rotterdam’s 
significance as a port means that many imports to northern Europe enter through the Netherlands even 
if their final destination is, for example, Germany.   8
revenue while the high-tariff country does not even obtain the intended protection for 
its producers.
11  Thus, true FTAs are rare, although the term has been hijacked and 
applied to RTAs which are not CUs. 
 
4.  The “New Regionalism” and Deep Integration 
 
A novel feature of RTAs of the 1980s such as the Australia-New Zealand Closer 
Economic Relations, the US Canada Free Trade Agreement, or the EU enlargements, 
was that they involved countries with fairly low tariffs.  Vinerian trade creation or 
trade diversion was likely to have small welfare implications, which raises the 
question of why were such RTAs formed.  Supporters of the deeper EU, NAFTA or 
the CER argued that these were new forms of regionalism going into areas where the 
Vinerian analysis was inapplicable, such as increasing-returns industries, policy 
harmonization, or service activities.
12   
Most economies have policies to limit the creation or abuse of monopoly 
power.  They differ in name (anti-trust, restrictive practices, anti-monopoly, 
competition policy, etc), and also differ in content and application.  Content varies 
primarily due to differing views on the appropriate trade-off between permitting 
efficient realization of economies of scale and limiting the market power which large 
enterprises are likely to have.  Lax implementation may reflect “capture” of the 
regulators by the people they are supposed to be regulating or lack of resources 
devoted to the regulatory authority.  The issue for regional integration was illustrated 
when the EU was moving towards deeper integration in the 1980s.  Members with 
tougher competition policies felt that firms from countries with laxer competition 
policies had a competitive edge, because monopoly profits at home could cover their 
fixed costs, enabling them to have lower marginal costs and hence be able to price 
more aggressively in other EU markets.  This could initiate a race to the bottom, but 
                                                 
11 Many authors (e.g. Crawford and Fiorentino, 2005, 17) state that RoOs can prevent trade deflection, 
but that is only true as a general statement if trade deflection is defined to include only direct trade 
deflection.  Where tariffs are low, intra-FTA transport costs are high or products are differentiated (as 
in, for example, EFTA), then indirect trade deflection is less likely, although when it does occur there 
will be a deadweight welfare loss due to augmented transport costs.  For analysis of trade deflection, 
see Pomfret (1997/2001, 185-8). 
12 The term deeper integration to capture regional agreements in these new areas was popularized by 
Robert Lawrence (1996).   9
that would allow undesirable abuse of monopoly power across the EU internal 
market, so the preferred solution was to negotiate a common competition policy. 
Policy harmonization applies to many other areas.  Non-tariff barriers hamper 
regional integration, and in many cases are used by producers to segment markets in 
order to enjoy local monopoly power.  Major steps in creating the EU internal market 
involved establishing principles of mutual recognition and disallowing minor 
variations in safety, health or environment standards, although this has led to tedious 
case-by-case judgments.  The landmark Cassis de Dijon case, in which a German law 
requiring liqueurs to have a minimum 32% alcohol content was found to have no 
public health justification, established that goods could not be redefined when they 
entered another EU country.  Similarly, the German Reinheitsgebot, which set 
standards for beer purity, was declared an inadmissible non-tariff barrier.  The 
specificity of judgments is, however, reflected in a case brought against a Danish law 
on reusable beer and soft drinks bottles, which non-Danish beer producers argued was 
a restriction on the free internal market, but which the EU allowed to continue as a 
justifiable environmental protection measure. 
As border measures such as tariffs and non-tariff barriers to trade diminish, the 
significance of other trade costs becomes more apparent (Anderson and van Wincoop, 
2004).  If the behind-the-border costs vary from country to country, then the trade 
playing field is not flat.  Foreigners will find greater difficulty in penetrating the 
market of a country which has poorly developed infrastructure, financial sector and 
other support services.  This concept of unfairness has been most often voiced by the 
USA, which sees its home market as easier to supply than other countries’ markets, 
and hence US exporters and import-competing producers are at a competitive 
disadvantage.  Similar market opening pressures became a feature of the EU’s market 
deepening, especially with respect to financial services after the last national-level 
capital controls were removed in the early 1990s.  The third wave bilateral trade 
agreements often include measures of financial sector liberalization, especially when 
pushed by the USA or Singapore whose home financial sectors are relatively efficient. 
A disadvantage of the second and third wave RTAs is that their increased 
complexity means that interest groups, who are well-informed about a particular 
sector, may become involved in design of the agreement and may shape the RTA to 
their own, but not necessarily the national, benefit.  In the Vinerian analysis trade 
diversion is often more politically acceptable than trade creation because the losers   10
from trade diversion (domestic taxpayers and non-preferred foreign suppliers) have 
little impact on the policymaking process, whereas the costs from trade creation are 
born by domestic producer interests, who are typically better organized and more 
powerful in shaping policy.  Thus, there is a potential trade-diverting bias in CU or 
FTA design, which is one justification for the GATT/WTO requirement that an FTA 
or CU should cover virtually all trade so that countries cannot customize RTAs to 
include only sectors where trade diversion is more likely.
13  With deeper integration 
the exclusions may be less transparent.   In NAFTA, the RoOs have been used 
especially for textiles and apparel and for automobiles to favour trade diversion.   
More broadly, the very detailed RoOs in NAFTA serve to manage trade, often to the 
benefit of specific US firms, while as a tax on intermediate inputs the RoOs’ global 
impact is presumed to be negative (Krueger, 1999).
14  The extension to service sectors 
in deep integration arrangements almost inevitably increases the opportunity for rent-
seeking, because most service providers are governed by regulations which may be 
desirable but which also offer the opportunity to erect discriminatory barriers to 
trade.
15 
Despite the novel features of the third wave of regionalism, the thrust of the 
analysis of the first two waves remains valid.  Even in the new areas, multilateral non-
discriminatory trade liberalization is usually the best approach not only from a 
cosmopolitan global perspective, but also often for the net economic welfare of the 
participants in potential regional arrangements.
16  The lack of transparency and the 
selective coverage of second- and third-wave RTAs make it more likely, given the 
political economy of trade policy, that trade-creating opportunities will be passed over 
because they hurt domestic producers while trade diversion will be permitted.  Such 
selectivity might facilitate reaching agreement on a RTA, but, as happened with most 
of the first wave RTAs, it will undermine the sustainability of the new bilaterals. 
                                                 
13 Despite the restriction in GATT Article XXIV, European producers managed for several decades to 
ensure through the use of non-tariff measures that the preference margins were especially high on 
agriculture, textiles and clothing, cars and steel - all sectors where trade diversion was likely to exceed 
trade creation. 
14 The 900+ pages required to document the North American Free Trade Agreement illustrate the 
earlier point that many RTAs described as FTAs do not fit the formal definition of a free trade area, 
which would require a very simple agreement to abolish tariffs on internal trade.  This applies to all of 
the so-called free trade areas in Table 1. 
15 Messerlin (2005) cites the example of the high-level French lobbying to exclude bailiffs, notaries and 
barristers to the Supreme Courts from the EU Directive on Services. 
16 This chapter does not address monetary integration, but a similar generalization about the economic 
benefits of a single money applies, subject to caveats about the optimal administration of monetary 
policy; see Pomfret (2005b).   11
 
5.  Rethinking the Level of Analysis 
 
Deep integration, or the final level in Balassa’s taxonomy (economic union), poses an 
analytical problem.  At what stage does an RTA become a nation state?  We no longer 
think of the German, Italian, Canadian or Australian customs unions as RTAs, 
because the CU element was subsumed in nation-state formation.  Today, the EU is 
not a nation state, but in some international organizations it has a single voice (eg. the 
WTO); at what point should the EU be treated as a single unit in the global economy? 
What determines the size of nations?  Alesina, Spoloare and Wacziarg (2000) 
argue that the number of nations is endogenous to the state of the global economy.  
The optimal size of a nation depends upon the marginal benefits of size (eg. ability to 
provide public goods such as national security which are characterized by scale 
economies) and the marginal costs of size (eg. increased difficulty in reaching 
agreement on national policies).  One of the benefits of size is a larger domestic 
market, but this is less important in a global economy characterized by low barriers to 
international trade.
17  Other things equal, in a more open global economy the optimal 
size of a nation is smaller and there will be more nations.  As evidence in support of 
the hypothesis that the global trade regime matters, Alesina, Spoloare and Wacziarg 
contrast the 1920s and 1930s, when trade barriers were high and there was no increase 
in the number of nations, with the GATT/WTO era, when substantial decline in 
average tariffs was accompanied by an increase in the number of nations from about 
seventy to over two hundred. 
Others view the proliferation of small states as part of a challenge to the 
primacy of the nation state in the global economic system.  During the 1960s and 
1970s the major economies realized that they had to accept limits on their monetary 
policy independence if they wanted to have efficient global capital markets and 
exchange rate stability.  This trade-off has played out in other areas where the 
demands of an efficient global economy imply restrictions on national policy 
autonomy.   Rodrik (2000), in a review of the global economy over the period 2000-
                                                 
17 Alesina and Spoloare (2005) analyse the relationship between the benefits of size in the provision of 
national security and the likelihood of war, arguing that a better defined global security regime 
encourages country break-up (ie. an increase in the number of nations) but also leads to numerous local 
conflicts.   12
2099, foresees the rise of global federalism as the most important trend, driven by the 
need to reconcile the pressure for global policies with democratic control. 
A more general view of this process is captured by the term “subsidiarity”, i.e. 
each policy should be dealt with at the lowest efficient level of decision-making.   
Some policies are more efficiently determined at a local level, eg. refuse disposal or 
zoning laws, while others are best done at a global level, eg. world trade law or the 
law of the sea, and the rest are best done at a variety of intermediate levels (regional, 
national, provincial, etc.).  This process is most advanced in the EU, where national 
governments have simultaneously ceded some policy autonomy to the EU and some 
policy autonomy to sub-national regions such as Scotland, Catalonia, or Brittany.  In 
general, the move from a centralized state to forms of fiscal federalism is positively 
related to the level of per capita income (Arzaghi and Henderson, 2005). 
A positive building block argument for regional agreements is that they can be 
testing grounds for international policies in new areas, although turning a policy 
designed by a few countries into a global institution may arouse fears of it being 
moulded to the designers’ interests.
18    An alternative building block argument is to 
recognize that regional agreement in a controversial new area may be easier than 
global agreement; the EU’s harmonization of competition policy illustrated the 
difficulty of reaching agreement even among countries with fairly similar economic 
structures. 
Although RTAs focussing on non-tariff issues may become a feature of the 
global economy in future, it is important to emphasise that the process is at an 
embryonic stage.  The empirical evidence in favour of the use of the nation state as 
the basic unit in international economics is strong.  Even in the highly integrated 
North American market, Canadian trade exhibits a surprisingly large home-country 
bias.  This was highlighted by John McCallum (1995), who found a large border 
effect in a gravity model analysis of trade among Canadian provinces and US states, 
and by Charles Engel and John Rogers (1996) who found a large border effect in 
analysing price variation across nine Canadian and fourteen US cities; in both studies 
distance matters, whether in determining trade flows or price arbitrage, but there is a 
huge discontinuity when the national border is crossed, even when it is an open border 
                                                 
18 The ill-fated multilateral investment agreement designed by the OECD is perhaps an example.  The 
low and middle-income countries were never likely to accept a global regime on foreign investment 
designed by the rich countries which were the home of most transnational corporations.   13
between two economies with low trade barriers and to some degree similar cultures.  
McCallum graphically compared the volume of trade between Ontario and British 
Columbia with that between Ontario and California; although the Californian 
economy is much larger than that of BC and roughly equidistant from Ontario, 
Ontario trades much more with BC.  The magnitude of McCallum’s border effect has 
been questioned by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), who also argue that a border 
effect is far more significant for the large country (the USA) than for the smaller 
country (Canada), but the presence of a US-Canada border effect seems 
incontrovertible. 
Market forces may override a border effect even in the absence of a formal 
RTA.  In North America, close relations between San Diego and Tijuana and other 
border pairs pre-dated NAFTA, and there is also a Great Lakes industrial region in 
which southern Ontario is more closely linked to south-east Michigan than to other 
parts of Canada (in contrast to McCallum’s continent-wide finding).  In East Asia, 
Sijori (Singapore-Johor-Riau) and the Pearl River Delta have been identified as sub-
regional economic zones, which incorporate parts of neighbouring countries.  In both 
these cases the process of regional integration involves parts of some countries, not 





The theory and practice of RTAs has evolved considerably over the last half century.  
Viner’s analysis remains relevant to any discriminatory arrangement, including RTAs, 
which is based on preferential tariffs or, with modifications depending on the specific 
measure, to non-tariff barriers imposed on a preferential basis.  Attempts to form 
seriously discriminating RTAs have foundered in Latin America and Africa, and 
failed to get off the ground in Asia, largely because policy makers did not want to 
bear the trade diversion costs of importing from inefficient producers in partner 
countries.  The most salient RTAs in the current world economy (the European 
Union, the North American Free Trade Area, or Closer Economic Relations between 
                                                 
19 This alternative view of the role of distance arises from the New Location Theory (Krugman, 1991; 
Fujita, Krugman and Venables, 2002) in which the existence of cities implies some scale economies.  
When such agglomeration effects spill across borders, the phenomenon is often referred to as a sub-
regional economic zone (Pomfret, 1996).   14
Australia and New Zealand) all have liberal external trade policies, so that they could 
properly be called regional arrangements for matters beyond trade.   
In a world where tariffs and simple non-tariff trade barriers have diminished, 
other trade costs come to the fore, and as markets become more regionally or globally 
integrated there are increasing pressures for harmonization in a greater number of 
policy areas.  In this process, regional arrangements have a role to play as some policy 
regimes may desirably be supra-national but sub-global.  Regional arrangements may 
also be testing grounds for innovations in policy coordination or harmonization, and 
hence act as building blocks towards identifying well-designed global policies.  On 
the other hand, the increased complexity of regional arrangements which cover such 
areas opens up opportunities for managed trade that can benefit insiders and become a 
stumbling block to progress at the global level.
20  
                                                 
20 The stumbling block case has been most forcefully argued by Jagdish Bhagwati, and in joint 
contributions by Bhagwati and Panagariya (1996).  Bhagwati emphasises the negative systemic 
consequences of eroding the non-discrimination principle.  Estevadeordal and Suominen (2003), whose 
catalogue of RoOs shows them  to be often product-specific and rarely consistent from one RTA to 
another, conclude that failure to harmonize RoOs exacerbates hub-and-spoke relationships and is an 
obstacle to freer global trade.  Özden and Reinhardt (2005) provide empirical evidence, based on 
eligibility for favourable treatment under the Generalized System of Preferences for developing 
countries, that preferential access to export markets is associated with less liberal trade policies towards 
imports.  There is also evidence in the Doha Round negotiations that countries benefiting from 
preferential market access for important exports are opposed to multilateral trade liberalization by their 
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Table 1: RTAs notified to the WTO January-June 2005 
 
Agreement  Notification date WTO Provisions Type of agreement 
Thailand-Australia  5 January  Article XXIV  Free trade agreement
Thailand-Australia  5 January  GATS Art.V  Services agreement 
Moldova-Bulgaria  28 January  Article XXIV  Free trade agreement
Moldova-Bosnia &H  28 January  Article XXIV  Free trade agreement
Moldova-Serbia &M  28 January  Article XXIV  Free trade agreement
Moldova-Croatia  31 January  Article XXIV  Free trade agreement
Moldova-FYROM  31 January  Article XXIV  Free trade agreement
Romania-Bosnia &H  14 February  Article XXIV  Free trade agreement
Romania -Serbia &M  14 February  Article XXIV  Free trade agreement
Romania -FYROM  14 February  Article XXIV  Free trade agreement
Bulgaria-Bosnia &H  11 March  Article XXIV  Free trade agreement
Bulgaria -Serbia &M  11 March  Article XXIV  Free trade agreement
Panama-El Salvador  18 March  Article XXIV  Free trade agreement
Croatia-FYROM  1 April  Article XXIV  Free trade agreement
Panama-El Salvador  5 April  GATS Art.V  Services agreement 
Japan-Mexico  22 April  Article XXIV  Free trade agreement
Japan-Mexico  22 April  GATS Art.V  Services agreement 
Romania-Israel  25 April  Article XXIV  Free trade agreement
FYROM-Bosnia &H  11 May  Article XXIV  Free trade agreement
EFTA-Tunisia  7 June  Article XXIV  Free trade agreement
 
Source: http://www.wto.org – accessed 19 October 2005 